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I 
Since few studies have explicitly focused on the impact 
of China's one-child-family policy on Chinese women, this 
thesis is designed to explore this aspect. The implication of 
the policy for both urban and rural women is studied, 
particularly its influence on women's fertility behavior, 
labor roles, and on social, heal th and family status. The 
2 
focus of the study is to explore the changes of women's lives 
associated with the one-child-family policy, and advantages 
and disadvantages, even contradictions the policy has brought 
to women's lives. 
The 
sources 
thesis involves 
a) descriptive 
library research, utilizing as 
statistical data (e.g., Chinese 
Population Yearbook; b) historical and interpretive research 
(e.g., studies cited in the literature review section); and c) 
media accounts (e.g., Women of China, a monthly magazine; 
Beijing Review, a weekly magazine, and China Today, a monthly 
magazine). 
The descriptive data analysis shows that the policy 
benefits urban Chinese women more than it does women in the 
countryside. This is mainly because most of the incentives, 
such as space for housing, wage bonuses, and extended 
maternity leaves, function effectively among urban women. In 
contrast, these incentives turn out to have little appeal to 
rural families, especially rural women. What's more, the 
associated disincentives seem to make rural women's lives even 
harder. In addition, the deeply-rooted feudal ideas together 
with the conflict between the policy and reality have put 
rural women into a more difficult situation than urban women. 
In short, the one-child-family policy is more threatening to 
rural women than to urban women in China. 
China needs to reduce its huge population. Women in China 
need to improve their status at home as well as in society. Is 
3 
the one-child-family the best solution? The thesis concludes 
with a discussion of this issue. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The socialist revolution in 1949 was accompanied by 
structural changes that began to upgrade the status of women 
in China. The Marriage Law of 1950 removed certain legal 
restrictions on women, and allowed further advances. The Law 
not only abolished the feudal marriage and family system of 
marriage based upon arbitrary decision by a third party, or on 
mercenary marriage, but also put into effect the new 
democratic marriage and family system based on the free choice 
of partners, on monogamy, and on equal rights for both sexes 
(Encyclopedia of China's Law). The Marriage Law was the first 
law that the new People's Republic of China promulgated after 
its founding in 1949 (Women of China, 1990), and it was the 
first democratic marriage law in Chinese history. Before that, 
the feudal patriarchal family system went hand in hand with 
arranged marriages, male chauvinism and indifference to 
women's wants and feelings. In recent years, the government 
has been carrying out the one-child-family policy, which, to 
some extent, has helped improve the status of women even more. 
Generally speaking, the single-child-family policy is one 
of the most important new policies which have changed the face 
2 
of China since the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976. Its 
implications for the future social structure and development 
-·, 1,, ,: 
of China are fundamental. The policy, inaugurated in 1979, had 
its origins in the government's concern that if population 
growth is not slowed down and eventually reversed, China can 
- ' 
not achieve the economic growth for which it is striving.' 
Therefore, since 1979, all couples of child bearing age have 
been urged to limit their offspring to one child. In order to 
realize this goal, heavy political and social pressure has 
been used and a vast set of incentives and disincentives has 
been developed to reward those who obey the national program 
l 
>1 J 
and to penalize those who do not~-l~owever, since the policy 
conflicts sharply with traditional Chinese values and is 
problematic in other ways, it is difficult to carry out~ Its 
success or failure will have far-reaching implications for the 
economic, social and political development of China. 
Furthermore, this Chinese experiment surely has important 
implication for the nations throughout the world which are 
undergoing early stages of urbanization and so called 
modernization, since rapid population expansion continues to 
confront most such nations. 
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Of all the post-Mao population studies done on China so 
far, most have focused on social and family structural changes 
3 
caused by the one-child-family policy, and on the influence of 
the policy on China's economy and four modernizations. 1 Little 
attempt has been made to examine the subtle but important 
changes the policy has brought to the status of Chinese women. 
Also lacking are comparisons of the effects of such changes on 
urban and rural women in China. Therefore the purpose of this 
thesis is to examine the impact of China's single-child-
family policy on Chinese women and the possibly differential 
influence of the policy on rural and urban women. Descriptive 
statistics will be used to illustrate the changes in women's 
lives and more specifically the differential changes between 
rural and urban women. Special attention will be given to 
changes in women's educational levels, employment status, and 
their positions at home as well as in society. The thesis will 
begin with historical background, followed by an explanation 
of the family-planning policy. Then there will be an analysis 
of the current situation of Chinese women, using data 
collected from various sources, to explore the advantages, 
disadvantages, and major changes in women's lives associated 
with China's single-child-family policy. This study is 
significant because the success or failure of the single-
child-family policy initiatives, and thus the future 
development of China, rests heavily upon the evolving status 
Four modernizations ref er to modernizations in 
industry, agriculture, defense and science. 
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of Chinese women, especially in regard to their childbearing 
roles, and their acceptance or rejection of that status. 
HYPOTHESES 
Based on analysis of available data on the subject at 
hand, two hypotheses are advanced: 
1. Since the implementation of the one-child-family 
policy, changes in women's lives in China have occurred, 
specifically: 
a. Women's age at first marriage has increased; 
b. Years spent in childbearing and child rearing have 
decreased; 
c. Social welfare for young mothers (of only one child) has 
increased; 
d. The percent of women of childbearing age who use 
contraceptives has increased. 
2. The one-child-family policy benefits urban women much 
more than it does women in the countryside. 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
China is the most populous country on earth, with 
approximately 1.2 billion people, over a fifth of the world's 
total population (Hou, 1991). 
i I . -
_/i • 
:overpopulation here, as 
elsewhere, is associated with serious social and economic 
problems:lTo use only 7% of the world's arable land to feed 
,,--l 
22% of the world's population is not an easy accomplishment 
(Guo, 1990; Hou, 1991). Its average annual per capita gross 
national product, which is equivalent to 400 U.S. dollars, 
ranks China among the lowest income countries in the world 
(Hou, 1991). Also, there are 180 million (one-sixth of the 
population) illiterate and semiliterate people in China, about 
a quarter of the world's total (Hou, 1991). In addition, 
overpopulation impairs the development of China's industry, 
medical care, and social welfare, as well as the quality of 
women's lives. 
Unfortunately, the leaders of China did not anticipate 
the eventual problem of population when the People's Republic 
' - ~) 
of China was established in 1949. In fact, the leaders were 
pronatalists, encouraging large families, in accordance with 
the prevailing cultural norm that most of the leaders shared./ 
~ 
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~ Mao Zedong, for example, at one time encouraged the expansion 
of China's population. He was not worried about the country's 
having too many people, because, as he said, "Every stomach 
comes with two hands attached" (Worden, 1988:117). 
In the early 1950s, Professor Ma Yin-chu, a Chinese 
demographer, economist and former president of Beijing 
University, became convinced that China had to act seriously 
to control the rapid growth of the population. He did a 
thorough study of China's population and presented a theory of 
population control. Mao Zedong, however, was not convinced of 
the need for control. Instead he regarded Ma's suggestion as 
a "bourgeois" Malthusian theory. He believed that, "Of all 
things in the world, people are the most precious. Under the 
leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are 
people, every kind of miracle can be performed" (Worden, 
1988:123). He also believed that the Chinese masses were a 
major component of the productive forces, in fact the only 
component that was in healthy condition after the 8-year war 
with Japan and the 3-year Liberation War against Kuomindang. 
In the mid 1960s, the study of demography itself was 
forbidden. For the following ten years almost no professional 
work was done in the field of population studies. Related 
disciplines such as sociology and statistics had similar fate 
(Li, 1962; Wong, 1979). This suspension of demographic and 
related studies has had its costs. Basic information on the 
population characteristics of that period is lacking today. 
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Few professional demographic researchers were available then, 
and there were not enough library holdings of the necessary 
demographic literature (Coale, 1981}. In 1978 there was only 
one research institution on population in the whole country. 
By 1981, the number had been increased to over 20 (Tien, 
1981). 
The neglect of the population issue is also indicated by 
the lack of articles associated with this subject. (See Figure 
1.) 
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Figure 1. Demographic Articles in Newspapers and 
Journals (1950-1988). Source: The Journal of Asian 
Studies Vol.49, No.4, Nov.1990, P809. 
Nevertheless, China did have, beginning as early as 1956, 
three population control campaigns before the implementation 
8 
of the one-child-family policy. 
The first serious efforts to control population growth 
occurred from 1956 to 1958 (China Today, 90). By then, the 
rapid growth of population in China was recognized not only by 
demographers in the West, but also by Mao. "We have this huge 
population," he wrote in 1956. "It is a good thing, but of 
course it also has difficulties .... Steps must therefore be 
taken to keep our population for a long time at a stable 
level, say, of 600 million. A wide campaign of explanation and 
proper help must be undertaken to achieve this aim" (Worden, 
1988:123). Yet, the birth control drive made little progress 
during the first campaign. The main reason was the lack of an 
effective field organization for translating the Party's 
policies into action. There is no evidence that a national 
birth control organization had evolved by the time the Great 
Leap Forward2 interrupted the effort in the spring of 1958 
(Aird, 1990). 
A second campaign for birth control began in 1962 under 
Zhou En-lai, but it was disrupted during the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution3 in 1966. 
2 The Great Leap Forward: In 1958, Mao Zedong reverted to 
his earlier idea that China's masses, fired by revolutionary 
enthusiasm, could produce far more than they consumed. He 
argued that both in agriculture and industry "miracles" of 
production were possible. Therefore he called for three years 
of all-out efforts to produce a "Great Leap Forward" all 
across the land. 
3 The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution started in 
1966 and lasted for 10 years. Its ostensible purpose was to 
eliminate influences that Mao Zedong believed had corrupted 
~ 
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The third birth control campaign, again under Zhou, began 
in 1970 and has continued to the present. 
Generally speaking, state intervention in the internal 
affairs of the family can be divided into 3 stages: 
1.\Jn the 1950s and 1960s, the government had hoped to reduce 
population growth by a series of voluntary measures, such as 
education campaigns and encouragement of the use of 
contraception. Young people were primarily urged to plan 
fertility rather than to reduce the population. Just as 
individuals and couples were encouraged to plan their work, 
life, study and leisure, so they were encouraged to plan their 
childbearing. What was emphasized throughout the first stage 
was that the decision to space and limit births was a private 
family matter in which the individual couples themselves made 
decisions according to their own personal circumstances and 
wishes.) 
2. In the 1970s, the hope that people would voluntarily limit 
themselves had evolved into a series of agreements made at the 
local level. That is, the urban and rural communities were 
allowed to negotiate birth quotas with their resident 
families. Actually the early 1970s marked the beginning of a 
sustained attempt to implement family planning in China as 
part of a national population policy to reduce the birth rate. 
the Chinese Communist Party, but it was also an attempt by Mao 
to regain full control of the Party organization by destroying 
former colleagues who had attempted to limit his powers after 
the disaster of the Great Leap Forward. 
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"Wan, Xi, Shao" ("late, spaced and few") was the popular 
slogan at that time. That is, the major objective was 
reduction of fertility through later marriage, longer spacing 
and fewer children per couple. Program performance was 
measured by the late marriage rate, the planned birth rate, 
the birth limitation rate, live birth rate and natural 
increase rate {Chen, 1985). The second campaign achieved more 
success than the first one, including more effective 
contraceptive methods. Intrauterine devices and a new suction 
device for carrying out abortion began to be put into use for 
the first time. Yet both methods were available only in urban 
areas (Aird, 1990). 
3./By the end of the 1970s, however, it had become clear to 
the government leaders that family plans were too important to 
be left open for local negotiation. According to statistics, 
population in China had grown by more than 75% between 1949 
and 1978 (from 540 million to more than 900 million ) (Smith, 
1991). Although food grain production increased from 163.90 
million tons in 1952 to 304.75 million tons in 1978 (Ishikawa, 
1983}, the output of grain per capita actually dropped because 
of the fast population growth. "Raising 600 million children 
born since 1949 has required a total expenditure of l, 300 
billion yuan -- roughly 30% of the total gross national income 
over that same period," said Liu Zheng in 1982. 4 In 
4 Liu Zheng is the director of the Population Research 
Institute, Chinese People's University, and vice president of 
China's Demographic Society. 
f 
! 
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addition, two-thirds of the Chinese people would be under age 
23 by 1984, with many years of healthy fertility before them. 
Thus, China was faced with a demographic situation in which a 
rapidly expanding population of childbearing age needed to be 
called upon to accept drastic reduction in fertility. Even a 
one-child-family policy would not stop the tide of population 
growth in the short run. 
Given this alarming situation, Chinese researchers and 
planners began in the mid-1970s to consider new family 
limitation strategies and goals. Finally planners devised a 
drastic program for reducing the Chinese population over the 
course of the next century, which aimed at stabilizing the 
population at about 700 million. 
Beginning immediately, drastically reduce the 
average birth rate to reach the final fertility 
rate of one child per couple by 1985 and maintain 
that level ... by 2070. That is, 90 years from now, 
the total population should be stabilized at about 
700 million ... maximum efforts [must] be made in 
the next decade or two to advocate that all fertile 
women must begin now. It will be like a relay race, 
with each generation striving towards this goal. 5 
Therefore when the Second Session of the Fifth National 
People's Congress met in June, 1978, the question of 
population growth was discussed. The policy to encourage each 
couple to have only one child was announced in January, 1979. 
In September, the following year, the PCC (Party Central 
Committee) issued an "open letter" to call on all party and 
5 See Liu Zheng and Song Jian, "China's Population: 
Problems and Prospects", New World Press, Beijing, 1981, P31} 
• I 
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youth league members to take the lead in having only one 
child. Thus the government finally decided to take control of 
individual family decision-making. And the "one-child-family" 
policy had become a national goal. 
CHAPTER III 
THE ONE-CHILD-FAMILY POLICY 
As early as 1968, when China's fertility level reached 
its second highest peak since 1950, the total fertility rate 
was 7.025 children per woman of completed reproductive age. 
(The total fertility rate of women refers to the number of 
times a woman gives birth in her life.) In 1971, when the 
government started the third birth control campaign, the total 
fertility rate was still a high 5.442 {Chen, 1985). A decade 
later in 1981, only two years after the application of the 
one-child-family policy, the total fertility rate had dropped 
to 2.238 {Chen, 1985). Such a dramatic fertility transition 
/ 
in a large country and in so short a time has surely not been 
accomplished elsewhere to date. This achievement is even more 
impressive because the transition has taken place without a 
significant improvement in living standards or socio-economic 
development taking place before or during the transition 
period (Chen, 1985). 
Generally speaking, fertility reduction goes hand in hand 
with an increase in modernization and urbanization. For most 
societies, modernization precedes a significant fall in the 
birthrate, mainly because it takes many decades of education 
14 
and improved living conditions before families are convinced 
it is in their best interest to limit their reproduction rate. 
China's situation is really exceptional. In China, the birth 
rate fell very rapidly before modernization. For example, in 
1970, the birth rate was 33.59 per thousand, but it was 20.83 
per 1,000 in 1989 (Beijing Review, 1990). If we compare 
China's demographic statistics in 1985 with those in other 
parts of the world (see Table I), we see that the birthrate is 
lower than the world average and is approaching that of the 
developed countries (although it is still not as low as 
Chinese demographers had expected). In comparison to other 
developing countries, China's birthrate is extremely low (20 
as opposed to 35 per 1,000). 
China's situation is exceptional also because of the 
reciprocal relationship between China's modernization and the 
control of its population. To put it in another way, on the 
one hand, the Chinese government hopes that the development of 
modernization and urbanization will lead to the decline in 
fertility. On the other hand, the government realized that the 
very development of modernization depends heavily on the 
degree to which China can reduce its population growth rate. 
In order to handle the dilemma of reducing population and 
developing the economy, Chinese government finally decided to 
use the dramatic strategy and tactic --- the one-child-family 
campaign, and has had authority to implement the strategy 
rather effectively. 
------------------~"---
TABLE I 
CHINA'S BIRTHRATE --- COMPARISONS WITH 
THE REST OF THE WORLD 
1988 
REGION BIRTH RATE (PER 1,000) 
CHINA 
WORLD 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
LESS DEV.(EXCL.CHINA) 
JAPAN 
SWEDEN 
U.K. 
CANADA 
AUSTRALIA 
u. s. 
NEW ZEALAND 
INDIA 
HAITI 
BANGLADESH 
ETHIOPIA 
MALI 
21 
28 
15 
35 
11 
12 
13 
15 
15 
16 
16 
33 
41 
43 
46 
50 
Source: extracted from Population Reference Bureau, 
1988, World Population Data Sheet (Washington D.C.; 
Population Reference Bureau, Inc. 
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Although this campaign is widespread, there is no single 
national family planning law (Davin, 1985; Renmin Ribao, 
1980). The Fifth National People's Congress in 1980 expected 
to issue a national package, with some standardization of 
regulations, but it was unable to reach an agreement (Renmin 
16 
Ribao, 1980). Thus the national program of incentives and 
disincentives proposed in 1979 was never passed. In general, 
the current population policy aims to control population 
growth, improve the quality of population, ensure the 
reproduction of healthy children and improve their upbringing. 
A couple is generally encouraged to have only one child; 
however, some couples can have a second child several years 
after their first birth (See Appendix for other exceptions). 
The detailed regulations are worked out by the local 
authorities in accordance with different situations. That is, 
to implement the one child family policy, various economic 
benefits and disincentives are applied. These regulations 
differ from one place to another, especially from urban to 
rural areas. 
The major economic incentives in various provincial 
regulations iriclude wage bonuses, extra work points, and 
housing priorities. Mothers who pledge to have one child will 
receive additional maternity leave. The only child is eligible 
for a range of benefits in kindergarten, school, and 
university enrollment, and priority in employment placement 
after graduation. 
These incentives have been rather effective for people in 
the cities, but have had little appeal to rural families 
(Dalsimer and Nisonoff, 1987). For example, space within 
housing is not a problem for most rural families whereas it is 
a major problem for most urban families. Wage bonuses apply 
I 17 
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mainly to urban parents who earn wages at factories, offices, 
and enterprises, and seldom to agricultural rewards. Some 
wealthy rural enterprises offer bonuses, but they are lower 
than urban bonuses. Under the new agricultural responsibility 
system, both the work point incentives and extended maternity 
leaves are unlikely to have much effect. With the exception of 
free health care, the various welfare benefits are rarely 
available to most rural families. Because these incentives 
have not worked well in the countryside, some rural areas have 
sought to offer additional grain allotments, larger family 
plots, or job preference in commune industries to one-child 
families (Dalsimer and Nisonoff, 1987). 
The punishments (disincentives) more often affect rural 
families, but their efficiency is limited. Some disincentives 
used in the rural areas include reductions in state grain 
allotments for second and third children, expropriation of 
family goods (such as television sets, bicycles, or sewing 
machines), fines on overquota births, or withdrawal of part of 
the families' fertile plots under the family responsibility 
system. 
The one-child-family policy has affected almost everyone 
in the nation. Then what special effect does it have on 
Chinese women as a whole? The following chapter presents the 
major findings on changes in Chinese women's lives associated 
with the policy. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE GENERAL INFLUENCE OF THE POLICY ON CHINESE WOMEN 
In the past twelve years, during which the one-child-
family policy has been in effect, several general changes have 
occurred. The birth rate of China has decreased, and women's 
lives have been greatly changed in many aspects. This section 
will mainly deal with the impact of the one child family on 
Chinese women as a whole. 
First of all, Chinese women's age at first marriage has 
changed. In 1972, the average age at marriage for urban women 
was 22.6, and 21.0 for rural women. By the end of 1979, the 
first year of the implementation of the one-child-family 
policy and its associated late marriage programs raised the 
mean age at first marriage, which increased to 24.6 and 22.8 
for urban and rural women respectively (See Table II). The 
results from a 1982 survey show that the average marriage age 
for urban and rural women had reached 25.19 and 22.54 
respectively. In Shanghai (the largest city in China) the 
average marriage age for women had jumped to 26.8 from 22.6 by 
1981. 
The increasing age for first marriage is mainly due to: 
the tightly controlled marriage permits by local government. 
I 19 
In the past, there was no serious control of age for marriage. 
Usually, soon after a man and a woman got engaged, they had a 
wedding ceremony, and announced their formal marriage to 
people around. 
TABLE II 
WOMEN'S AVERAGE AGE AT MARRIAGE, BY YEAR OF 
MARRIAGE AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE 
Year of Marriage Urban Rural 
1972 22.6 21. 0 
1979 24.6 22.8 
Source: H. Yuan Tien, 'Age at Marriage in the People's 
Republic of China', China Quarterly, 
March 1983. 
After the one child family policy was announced in 1979, 
the central government issued a strict regulation to restrict 
young people from having an early marriage. The legal age for 
women to get married now is 22. Since 1979, it has been 
extremely difficult to get a marriage permit before the age of 
22. The purpose of this practice is to postpone the average 
marriage age of young women, and in turn delay childbearing 
age and finally reduce the nation's fertility rate. 
Secondly, Chinese women, generally, no longer have the 
alternative to give birth to more than one child. The "birth 
quota" system in the one-child-family policy indicates that· 
each married woman can have only one child. And birth quotas 
l 20 
are usually decided upon nationally and distributed downward 
to provinces, cities, towns, counties, and other basic local 
levels. Therefore, before a woman gets pregnant, she is 
expected to get a birth quota certificate from her local 
official in charge of birth control. Or she must report to the 
local birth control office within the first three months of 
her pregnancy. Failure to do so will result in a fine or/and 
"mobilization" to get an abortion. In addition, without this 
official authorization, she is unable to get prenatal care 
because she does not have the authorization paper to show to 
the local health clinics or hospitals. And the "unplanned" 
new-born baby will have difficulties later in registering for 
grain allotments, schooling and medical care. 
Third, the percentage of women using contraceptives has 
gone up very rapidly since 1979. 
Even during the early 1970s, contraceptives were seldom 
used in the country. In some poor and remote areas, 
contraception had never been heard of. A decade later, in 
1982, only three years after the implementation of the one 
child family policy, this had changed dramatically. "China's 
contraceptive prevalence rate was as high as that in developed 
low-fertility countries. According to the one per thousand 
sample fertility survey carried out in 1982, 69.46% of the 
married women of reproductive age (aged 15-49) were 
contracepting" (Chen, 1985). By comparison, in Japan only 61% 
of the married women age 15-49 were practicing contraception 
21 
in 1976, and 69% of married women aged 15-44 in the U.S. were 
contracepting in the same year (Yan, 1983; Davis-Friedmann, 
1983) . 
The most frequently used contraceptive method among 
Chinese women is the !DD, which accounts for 50.2% of all 
contraceptives in China (1/1,000 survey in 1982). In the 
urban areas, 39% of women rely on IUDs, while the percentage 
for rural women is 53% (Chen, 1985). 
The second most popular contraceptive method used in 
China is sterilization, accounting for 35% of China's total 
contraceptives in 1982. Of this 3 5%, 2 5% are women users 
(Chen, 1985). 
Several varieties of oral contraceptives and condoms are 
also utilized in China, but mainly among urban women (Chen, 
1985). 
The increase in the late marriage rate for females, the 
prevalent usage of contraceptives among women, and the policy 
of "one woman, one child" have brought a sharp fertility 
decline to the nation. For example, in 1973, three years after 
the third birth control campaign, the total fertility rate was 
still 4.539 (2.387 and 5.008 for urban and rural areas 
respectively). In 1980, however, only one year after the 
implementation of the one-child-family policy, the total 
fertility rate dropped to 2.238 (1.147 for urban region and 
2.480 for rural region) (Chen, 1985; Qian and Xian, 1983). The 
crude birth rate dropped from 33.59 per thousand in 1970 to 
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20.83 per thousand in 1989 (Beijing Review, Oct.15-21, 1990). 
Meanwhile, the natural growth rate decreased from 25.83 per 
thousand to 14.32 per thousand (Beijing Review, 1990). "These 
indices are below the average of other developing countries," 
says Peng Pei-yun, "The rapid population growth is basically 
under control." 6 
Then what advantage and disadvantage do these practices 
have for Chinese women's daily lives? Do they have any 
influence on women's status at home and social images in 
society? Do urban and rural women get the same benefits form 
the policy? Are there any contradictions between the policy 
and Chinese women's interests? How can we predict the impact 
on later generations of women? The rest of the paper will be 
devoted to a discussion of these and related issues. 
6 Peng Pei-yun has been the Minister of the State Family 
Planning Commission since 1988. She said these words in an 
interview with the reporters from Women of China and China 
Today (See Women of China, Vol XXXX No.8 Aug. 1991:28) 
CHAPTER V 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE POLICY FOR URBAN WOMEN 
According to Ralf Dahrendorf, a famous conflict theorist 
in sociology, all institutional patterns display two mutually 
contradictory sets of role expectations ---- one to obey, the 
other to revolt ---- and therefore actors must decide which 
set they will follow (Porter and Taplin, 1987) .\The one-child-
'---
family policy can be regarded as a kind of institutional 
pattern, which generates contradictio~~. \\i~ generates the ___, 
contradiction between State's interests and the interests of 
_'.\ -
the people-JCif we consider urban and rural women as two 
different groups of actors, their basic reaction to the one-
child-family policy can be described as "One obeys, the other 
revolts". That is, one is compatible with the policy, the 
)\ -". 
other is contradictory to it.' 
_____, 
The implication of the policy and the reaction of both 
urban and rural women toward the policy can be explained also 
by the "theory of demographic change and response" (Weeks, 
1989:78). This theory emphasizes that people usually respond 
to the demographic change, but their response will be in terms 
of personal goals, not national goals. "People must perceive 
a personal need to change behavior before a decline in 
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fertility will take place, and the kind of response they make 
will depend on what means are available to them." (Weeks, 
1989:83). This theoretical perspective suggests a very 
important link between the every day lives of individuals and 
the kinds of population changes that take place in society. 
Based upon the fragments of theories discussed above, the 
following two chapters will make a detailed analysis of the 
implications of the one-child-family policy for urban and 
rural women, and their different reactions to it. 
Since 1979, considerable change has taken place in 
women's lives. Yet these changes have occurred unevenly due to 
geographical and economic impediments. The implications of the 
new family policy for both urban and rural women are even more 
difficult to assess. Generally speaking, the policy has turned 
out to have more advantages for urban women than for rural 
women. Available evidence suggests that the status of urban 
women has improved. Urban women seem to be much more willing 
to obey and accept this policy rather than to revel t or 
strongly oppose it. For instance, the overall attitude of 
urban women toward the gender of children has changed so that 
a female child is as acceptable as a male child; the time 
urban women spend in child rearing has been greatly shortened; 
urban women's educational levels have increased; the status of 
urban women at home has been raised; the social welfare and 
health care for young urban mothers have steadily improved; 
and urban women are much more active in participating in 
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working out of home, and engaging in the feminist movement. 
The following section will examine the impact of the one-
child-family policy on urban women's reproductive behavior and 
its relation to women's educational level. 
FERTILITY RATE AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL 
One effect on urban women's life is the decline in the 
number of years that they devote to caring for their children. 
According to the one per thousand fertility survey in 1982, 
the total number of children a married urban woman bore during 
1952-55 was 6.574. The total number increased to 7.622 during 
1955-58. Since the implementation of the one-child-family 
policy in 1979, the total fertility rate has dropped sharply. 
According to Li Bohua and Ronald Freedman, between 1979 -
1982, the average number of children an urban woman has 
dropped to 1.663. 
In the past, then, a woman had to spend much of her 
middle years, say from her early 20s into her mid 40s or 
beyond, engaging in childbearing and child rearing, 
accompanied by associated housework. According to Professor 
Zhu Chuzhu's survey study in 1987, 7 Chinese women before the 
1960s were mainly concerned with family life and human 
7 Professor Zhu Chu-zhu in Xi' an Jiaotong University 
conducted a special investigation on the life cycle of Chinese 
women in 1987. Women involved in this survey are from both 
urban and rural areas from 21 Provinces. She got back 1,612 
questionnaires for this survey. 
~- ~I 
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reproduction. They had little education and were scarcely 
aware of the experience of adolescence. "During their short 
life span of 50 years, 20 years would be occupied by frequent 
pregnancies and the raising of family (children)" (Zhu, 1991). 
The one-child-family policy has legally liberated women from 
the long period of child bearing and enabled them to develop 
their own interests, to seek after their own career, and to 
improve their own educational level. Just as Professor Zhu 
stated, "Family planning has greatly reduced the number of 
children a woman now receives (a woman would bear). The 
average number of births has now dropped from five or six, to 
two or three in a woman's life time." "They (Women) now 
practice late marriage, late childbearing and less of it." She 
says, "Less time is spent on giving birth nowadays and they 
(women) receive an education for over ten years" (Zhu, 1991) . 8 
Ten years of education for urban women might not be so 
significant in some relatively developed countries. In China, 
it is indeed an important fact. It is even more so when 
8 Zhu Chu-zhu is a professor of demography and economics 
at Jiaotong University in Xi'an, China. In 1988, Zhu 
participated in the project of "Co-ordinating Chinese 
Population Growth with Social and Economic Development," which 
won first prize in the National Award for Progress in Science 
and Technology. Zhu is an authority in the field of population 
studies concerning Chinese women. She is the first Chinese 
expert to undertake research on the life cycle of women. At 
present, she is responsible for a research project about 
"women's employment and child birth in China," sponsored by 
the UNFPA (United Nations Family Planning Association). Zhu is 
endeavoring to improve the social status of Chinese women. She 
often gives lectures on population theory and control, and its 
importance for the social and economic development of China. 
.. ---1 
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compared to the educational level of rural women in China {See 
Table III). 
TABLE III 
LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF RURAL WOMEN IN 1980 
Level of education % of women 
Senior Middle School 3.5 
Junior Middle School 9 
Primary School 45.0 
Illiterate 42.0 
100 
Source: Jingji Yanju (Economic Research), June 20, 1982. 
Based on the survey of 707 peasant women of childbearing 
age in 1980, we can see that only 3.5% of rural women have ten 
years education, 9. 5% of them have a seven to eight years 
education. Of these women, 45% go to school for five or six 
years, and 42% are simply illiterate. A report appearing in 
Women of China, March, 1990, revealed that in the past ten 
years, the serious educational situation of rural Chinese 
women has not changed much. 
Unlike rural women, more and more women in the cities 
have begun to engage in higher education. According to Worden, 
of all the college students in China, 24% of them are urban 
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women. Some of them are even at the top of the ivory tower. 9 
A postdoctoral research system was first introduced to 
China in 1985. According to Wang Xiaoming's report, since 
then, 161 postdoctoral research centers have been established, 
and 935 people have studied or are studying in these centers. 
Among these people, 39 are urban women. 
Thirty-nine is a small number, but it is a positive sign 
for women's, especially of urban women's, desire to get more 
education and be equal with men. 
"Since the practice of family planning in 1979, the 
dropping of birth rate has completely changed the female life 
cycle (in China)" (Zhu, 1991). Like the Marriage Law in 1950, 
which abolished the feudal marriage system restricting women, 
the one-child-family policy further upgrades women's status 
and legally liberates them from endless childbearing and child 
rearing. 
IMPROVED SOCIAL IMAGES 
As previously mentioned, the one-child-family policy has 
helped reduce the fertility rate and raise urban women's 
educational level steadily since it was first issued in 1979. 
Women's education is one of the most basic and important 
9 The temporary educational structure in China is often 
referred to as an Ivory Tower. The higher you go up the tower, 
the fewer people there are. Thus those engaged in postdoctoral 
research may be regarded as people at the top of the ivory 
tower. 
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factors in liberating women and changing their social images. 
Generally, education credentials seem to be more important for 
females than males in professional careers. Male superiors, 
let us suggest, are usually less confident in judging women's 
ability to do a job than in judging their education. The more 
education a woman has, the more likely she is to be employed 
(Farr, 1990; Fox, 1989). When women are freed from the burden 
of childbearing, they have more time and more opportunities to 
engage in education and special training. And the greater 
their educational level, the greater is their participation in 
production and in various kinds of social labor. This is 
important in a country with an age-old feudal tradition of 
male supremacy and contempt for women. The new breed of 
educated, capable women cannot be dismissed as having "long 
hair and little knowledge" (one of many such old sayings in 
the language). Many show remarkable ability. Quite a few of 
them have been selected as model workers and serve in local 
people's congress and other responsible bodies (Women of 
China, Vol. XXXIX, No.3, Mar.1990:18). One particular example 
is the rising number of women deputies in the National 
People's Congress and its Standing Committee. In 1954, at the 
First National People's Congress, women deputies comprised 
only 11. 9% of the Congress membership and only 5% of the 
Committee membership. But at the Seventh National people's 
Congress in 1988, the number rose to 21.34% and 11.6% (Huang, 
1990). 
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In fact, the number of employed urban women has been 
increasing constantly since 1979 and now accounts for more 
than 37% of the working force in China. What are the major 
factors that make urban women work outside the home? Kang Jun 
and his colleagues did a "systematical and multi-aspected 
survey" in 1989. A sample of one thousand-eight hundred female 
workers and staff from a total of 90 enterprises and 
institutions in seven cities were involved in this survey. 
These researchers classified the major employment motives into 
the following six categories listed in Table IV. 
TABLE IV 
MAJOR EMPLOYMENT MOTIVES OF URBAN WOMEN 
Order Motive Percentage 
First Generating Income 72.9% 
Second Striving equal social status with men 66.3% 
Third Making contributions to the society 64.7% 
Fourth Receiving recognition from society 37.1% 
Fifth Sharing in community life 29.8% 
Sixth Seeking employment because others do 22.8% 
Source: Women of China, June 1989, P43. 
According to Kang Jun, the major motive for urban women 
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to join the working force is financial (72%). The second most 
important motive is to strive for equal social status with men 
(66.3%). These two highest ranked motives suggest that many 
urban women have realized the strong relationship between 
economic independence and women's related social status. That 
is, economic independence can help women obtain equal social 
status with men. Above all, the results suggest a very obvious 
change in urban women's self-esteem and self-confidence. 
In a male-dominated country like China, women 
traditionally (prior to the communist revolution in 1949) 
thought about themselves as consumers and their husbands as 
bread-winners and providers. They seldom went out to work 
and their bound feet confined them completely to the stoves 
and homes. The change in attitude toward working outside and 
money-making reflects a noticeable transition of ideology. It 
indicates that urban women have started to consider their 
working out of the home as essential to the family income. The 
part they play in the family life is no longer dependent or 
subordinate. A 1990 survey of more than 2,000 women residents 
in ten cities, including Beijing, Harbin and Shanghai, 
indicates that over 80% of urban women favor the employment of 
women. Some 90% of the women surveyed felt that doing well in 
their work was an important goal. And about 70% said that 
career and family were equally important to them (Beijing 
Review, Nov.12-18, 1990). 
Shortly after the founding of the People's Republic in 
,.....-
..... 
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1949, there were only 2. 6 million women workers and staff 
members in the nation's cities, about 7.5% of the total work 
force (Beijing Review, Nov. 12-18, 1990) . "By 1989, urban 
women workers had numbered 51.37 million, accounting for 37.4% 
of the nation's total. The 1989 ratio, which was nearly five 
times that of 1949, is among the world's highest for women 
workers. In 1986, the employment rate for women in cities and 
towns was 82% nationwide. In 1989, the employment rate for 
women was as high as 95% in the Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone. 10 Between 1987 and 1988, the employment rate for women 
was higher than for men during the same period (Huang, 1990). 
Beijing Review confirmed again in March, 1991 that China 
has more than 51 million female workers, about 37% of the 
total work force. In the light industry and service trades, 
women account for 47.1%, and in joint ventures and foreign-
financed enterprises and institutions, they account for more 
than 50% of the staff. 
Of the nation's scientists and technicians, one-third are 
women and more than 10% of them hold professional titles such 
as professor, associate professor and senior engineer. There 
are 17,087 professors engaged in teaching in China's 
10 In order to promote economic exchange and cooperation 
with foreign countries, a decade ago China began to establish 
Special Economic Zones (ENZs). Now there are five of them: 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province, Xiamen in 
Fujian Province and the island province of Hainan. All are 
along the country's south and southeast coast. In these zones, 
special and more flexible preferential policies on outside 
investment are put into effect in order to attract capital 
from abroad . 
,.......-
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institutions of higher education and in research 
establishments and 1,570, or 9.2% of all professors, are 
women. Some 811 women, or 52% of all female professors, work 
in the medical field. In 1989, of the country's 445 state 
invention prize winners, 68 or 15% were women (Beijing Review, 
Mar. 11-17, 1991). 
Although China's "equal pay for equal work" policy and 
economic reform have encouraged women to work outside the 
home, and although the improvement of urban women's 
educational level has strengthened women's desire to work, 
the one-child-family policy seems to play a special role in 
urban women's participation in compensated labor. Without the 
reduced burden of childbearing and child rearing, women would 
not have enough time and energy to pursue formal education 
and special training. Without education and the related change 
of self-consciousness, urban women would not have the strong 
desire to become the equal financial partners of men. Nor 
would they think about further improvement of their social 
status. Even though the changing world and the current 
economic reform might finally achieve these, it will surely 
take a longer time. Therefore the one-child-family policy, 
together with its associated programs for women, has done the 
fundamental work of setting urban women free from home, and 
sending them out to become competitive money-makers in the 
society. 
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THE POLICY AND THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT 
Besides helping raise urban women's positions at home and 
in society, the one-child-family policy also helped start the 
feminist movement among urban female intellectuals in the 
1980s. 
Before the 1980s, most women in China were not very 
sensitive to the discrimination against them in the workforce 
and mistreatment in the family. They simply regarded their 
position at home or in the workplace as an institutionalized 
legitimacy, and seldom related their mistreatment to the 
issues of discrimination or the social inequality of women 
(Croll, 1985). They firmly believed that the establishment of 
socialism would automatically result in the liberation of 
women. 
Dramatic changes took place, however, in the 1980s. Newly 
founded women's magazines began to discuss women's problems 
explicitly. The pages of China Women's News, for instance, 
were filled with exposes and denunciations of discrimination 
faced by women. "Feminist outcries" began to appear with some 
regularity in print (Henig and Hershatter, 1988). This 
recognition of gender inequality at work and in the family 
also found expression in the emergence of separate women's 
organizations: schools, professional societies, and women's 
studies groups for example. The Chinese feminist movement was 
... 
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well under way, primarily among the urban female 
intellectuals. 
Then why is it that the feminist consciousness and 
movement in China occurred in the 1980s, instead of 1970s, 
60s, or 50s? How and why did it take place at all? 
Many analysts suggest that the precondition of this 
movement is the increasingly explicit and open decade after 
the end of the Cultural Revolution, particularly the economic 
reforms. Some argue that in the previous years, all work 
assignments had been centralized, and individual work units 
did not have any right to hire or fire workers. After 1978, 
.\ 
I 
however, much of this system changed. Work units were given 
the right to select new employees, and to hire and fire. The 
establishment of private enterprises was encouraged, and 
industrial companies were made responsible for their own 
prof its and losses. On the one hand, these policies created 
job opportunities for urban residents, including women. On the 
other hand, work units used their newly obtained powers to 
discriminate against women. On the whole, this argument holds 
that economic reforms had put women into a very difficult 
situation in the labor market, and that in turn generated the 
feminist movement. 
Other people argue that the feminist movement appeared in 
the 1980s because of the increasing availability of 
information about Western countries and Western feminist 
ideas. By then, newspapers and magazines frequently contained 
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reports about the lives and problems of women in the United 
States and Europe, and about feminism and the women's movement 
in the West. A number of Chinese women who had the opportunity 
to study in the West applied what they learned of Western 
feminist ideas to an understanding of their own predicament 
(Henig and Hershatter, 1988). 
Still others suggest that the movement should give thanks 
to the political liberalization of the post cultural 
revolution decade in China. They believe that it is political 
liberalization that made it possible for women to publicly 
discuss their dissatisfactions, and helped generate the 
appearance of many women's newspapers and magazines. (China 
has a state controlled press, and it was only after 1978 that 
people ventured to produce semi-official or non-official 
publications.) 
In my view, all the above preconditions were necessary 
for the emergence of China's feminist movement in the 1980s, 
but the most fundamental precondition was the one-child 
policy. 
Since the implementation of the one-child-family policy 
in 1979, most women intellectuals have placed much faith in 
it. They favored the one-child-family policy in that it 
legally reduced the number of years women must devote to 
childbearing and child rearing and enabled them to devote time 
to their own education, career and hobbies. At the same time, 
however, they disliked the revival of some feudal remnants of 
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the oppression of women caused by the population policy. For 
example, they were very concerned about the reappearance of 
female infanticide, the increased pressure on girls to leave 
school early and the uncontrollable wife-battering, etc. 
These and many other direct consequences of the one-child-
family policy forced intellectual urban women to reconsider 
their own value in society and at home from women's point of 
view. Also they were inspired to question the social 
structures in China and the series of policies imposed by the 
government. 
Why are women discriminated against in the labor market? 
Why should female intellectuals (academicians and other 
professionals) retire at age 55 while male intellectuals may 
continue to work to age 65? Why did Tianjin (one of the 
biggest cities in China) in 1985 enroll only 3% women workers 
and 97% male workers? Since there has long been a 
constitution to "protect" women, why should there be so much 
inequality? Some intellectual urban women felt that it was 
time for them to do something to express their thoughts, to 
protest women's inferior social position, and to awaken the 
consciousness of other women. The open-door policy and the 
information about the development of an active women's 
movement in the West helped them realize the options and 
alternatives. 
The discussion in the People's Republic of China of 
women's issues in the 1980s has been profoundly different from 
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earlier discussions in the following ways: 
1. The most recent discussion was started and directed by 
urban women intellectuals and has remained so. 
2. The movement has a very clear goal; that is, to 
improve Chinese women's awareness of themselves and their 
personal development, to put an end to women's self-
censorship, and to call on society as a whole to alter the 
context of women's lives. Women are not baby-making machines. 
They are human beings. As human beings, they must fight for 
their rights, their interests and their fulfillment (Henig and 
Hershatter, 1988). 
3. Feminist works of fiction appeared for the first time 
in China's history in the early 1980s. For instance, Zhang 
Jie, one of China's famous women writers, produced a short 
story in 1982 entitled "The Ark". It is about three divorced 
women, and was regarded by Western writers as China's first 
feminist work of fiction (Henig and Hershatter, 1988). One of 
the first public statements denouncing discrimination toward 
women was a poem by Wang Fuhua entitled "Four Questions", 
published in March 1983 in People's Daily. 11 Each stanza in 
the poem began with a phrase like "Times have changed; men and 
women are equal". It is Chairman Mao's phrase, and it has been 
used by the Communist Party to proclaim its success in 
liberating women after 1949. Therefore, the poet asked "why 
are men and women not equal?" The poem criticized 
11 A national newspaper in China. 
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discrimination toward women in almost every sector of society: 
in pay for agricultural work, factory hiring, college 
admission, and treatment in the family. Actually Wang was one 
of the first to publicly describe these phenomena as gender 
inequality (Henig and Hershatter, 1988). This and many other 
feminist outcries were significant because they expressed the 
awareness that the status of women was a social problem that 
remained unresolved. 
In short, the feminist movement in the 1980s in China 
occurred under rather complicated social and historical 
conditions. The one-child-family policy, no doubt, contributed 
to the emergence of the consciousness of women's issues. The 
following section will examine urban women's consciousness of 
the importance of birth control. 
CHANGED ATTITUDES 
In the past few years, with the help of the All-China 
Women's Federation, a network of family-planning workers has 
been set up in every city. These family planning workers hand 
out information on birth control, help women realize the 
importance of slowing population growth, and inform them of 
the material rewards for doing so and proper penalties for not 
doing so (China Today, Mar.1990:26). It seems that this 
program works especially well in big cities. Nowadays, most of 
the urban women have realized that the rising population is a 
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burden, not a blessing, to the country as a whole, to local 
areas and to individual families. Over-population is a 
tremendous stumbling block to social and economic development 
and to the improvement in people's living standards. 
What's more fascinating is that many educated urban woman 
have been organized by the All-China Women's Federation and 
have left the cities and towns in order to serve the needs of 
women in poor and remote villages throughout China. Their 
basic goal is to publicize the government's family planning 
policy and to ensure that women have rights and opportunities 
equal to those of men. 
The change in marriage and population ideology gives rise 
to the change in fertility behavior. The old, traditional 
views on early marriage, early childbearing and several births 
have been largely replaced by the practices of later marriage 
and smaller families. 
The following tables provide a comparison of urban and 
rural women on marriage, and fertility behaviors. 
First, an urban-rural comparison of the first marriage 
is presented in Table V. 
As indicated, in 1987, 2,510,339 urban women got married 
for the first time. Among those, 1,669,495 women were 23 years 
old or older (Over 23 is here considered late marriage). The 
late marriage rate was 66.50%. Compared with the late marriage 
rate in the countryside, the urban rate was 19.42% higher. 
While the number of urban women's late marriages increased by 
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92,126 from 1986, the number for rural women decreased by 
266,038. 
TABLE V 
FIRST MARRIAGE OF CHINESE WOMEN IN 1987 
Regions Total No. 23 Yrs or Compare Late Marriage 
Marriage Older Women with Rate 
1986 
Cities 2,510,339 1,669,495 +92,126 66.50% 
Country 5,044,246 2,374,640 -266,038 47.08% 
Source: Pamphlet of China's Population Document by China's 
Population Research Center in Beijing, Dec. 1988; derived 
from Tables 7 & 9, PP291, 293. 
As for the birth control rate (See Table VI) , urban 
women's rate is 2.88% higher than rural women's. 
Region 
Cities 
Country 
TABLE VI 
URBAN & RURAL WOMEN'S BIRTH CONTROL RATE 
BY METHOD IN 1987 
Hysterectomy IUD Other Total Birth 
Users Users Method Control 
Users Rate 
10,224,196 17,219,673 623,590 88.67% 
33,889,580 33,332,992 394,707 85.97% 
Source: Pamphlet of China's Population Document by China's 
Population Research Center in Beijing, Dec. 1988; derived from 
Tables 15 & 17; P299 & P301. 
Table VII shows that in 1987 the unplanned birth rate for 
urban women was 9.25%, while the rate was 20.61% for rural 
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women. Another indicator that suggests a different attitude 
between rural and urban women is a comparison of the 
percentage of those who obtain one-child-certificates (See 
Table VIII). 
TABLE VII 
UNPLANNED BIRTHS IN 1987 
Regions Total No. No. Unplanned Unplanned 
of Birth Birth Birth Rate 
All cities 3,451,833 319,212 9.25% 
Countryside 9,905,697 2,041,540 20.61% 
Source: Pamphlet of China's Population Document by 
China's Population Research Center in Beijing, Dec. 1988; 
derived from Tables 27 & 29. 
By the end of 1987, 32.3 million women overall got a one-
child-certificate, an increase of 1. 8 million over 198 6. 
(Chinese Population Yearbook 1988:280) If we study the data by 
urban-rural region, however, we find that the situation is 
uneven. Table VIII indicates that more than 2,210,765 urban 
women in 1987 than in 1986 claimed the one child certificates; 
the rate increased 1.26%. On the other hand, the number of 
rural women claiming the certificates in 1987 dropped 
1, 13 7, 816 from the year before, and the claiming rate was 
25.28% lower than that of urban women. 
It appears that it is much easier to carry out the one-
child-family policy in the cities than in the countryside. 
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Evidence also show that urban women react to the policy with 
a more active and positive attitude than their rural 
counterparts. But why are urban women more willing to accept 
the one-child-family policy than rural women? What are the 
existing preconditions for the achievements of the one-child-
family policy among urban women? 
TABLE VIII 
NUMBER AND RATE OF WOMEN GETTING ONE-CHILD-
CERTIFICATES IN 1987 
Regions Total No. Compare with Rate Compare 
Certificates 1986 ~ 0 with 1986 
All Cities 15,116,922 +2,210,765 35.96% + 1. 26% 
Country 10,755,338 -1,137,816 10.68% - 0.44% 
Source: Pamphlet of China's Population Document by China's 
Population Research Center in Beijing, Dec. 1988; derived from 
Tables 11 & 13, PP295 & 297. 
INCENTIVES FOR YOUNG MOTHERS 
Major factors that inspire urban women to have only one 
child are the various incentives offered by the government and 
the improved health care for young mothers and their babies. 
The following are the most popular rewards and chief health 
care programs that are available for urban women (Kane, 1985). 
The first program worth mentioning here is the 
development of a modern health-care network. Like a protective 
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umbrella, this network aims at protecting both mother and her 
child from the very beginning of a woman's pregnancy. 
Usually, when a "planned" pregnancy is confirmed, the 
woman may join the health care program by showing the 
"authorization" paper to the relevant doctor. Then she 
receives a card outlining the antenatal checkups required and 
a notebook to be used in recording her physical condition, the 
development of the unborn baby and the postnatal health of 
both mother and baby. She will be advised to read certain 
books about pregnancy, nursing and raising an infant. 
During her pregnancy, the woman receives free antenatal 
examinations in the third, fifth, sixth and eighth months. 
More frequent examinations will be conducted if there is any 
problem. Medical workers will give advice on appropriate 
activities, work and rest, and what kind and amount of 
physical work one can do. Guidance is also provided as to 
personal hygiene, diet and dress during pregnancy, and the way 
to avoid disease and minimize the risk of harm from radiation 
and certain medicines. The aim of this program is a trouble-
free pregnancy and delivery of a healthy baby. 
The introduction of the provision of a paid maternity 
leave only for the first child also plays an important part in 
encouraging urban women to become parents, but only once. The 
mothers of first borns can have three months paid maternity 
leave as soon as they give birth. Women no longer have to 
choose between working and having a child. In order to 
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overcome the concern of some women about entrusting their 
precious only child to outside care after the first three 
months, an alternative offer has been developed in some areas, 
that is, the extended maternity leave. A factory in Shanghai, 
for instance, "offers one year's maternity leave to single 
child mothers, granting full pay and an assurance that neither 
their promotion prospects nor wage increases will be 
jeopardized as a result" (Kane, 1985). Some textile mills in 
Henan Province offer a three-year-maternity leave to single-
child mothers, with 60% of pay per month (Women of China, 
1991). 
Through such policies, urban women are given the choice 
of looking after their only child themselves. 
The increasingly improved day-care centers and 
cooperative child care arrangements make it possible for 
working mothers to go back to work after their maternity 
leave. This, in turn, encourages their working units to give 
them further training and career development. With a job to go 
back to, the fact that childbearing is the only future for 
married women is no longer true. 
Additionally, there is a rapid development of the 
associated servic~ facilities in the cities, such as 
laundries, sewing and clothes-mending shops and repair shops 
for household equipment. These and many other public services 
help lighten the burdens of urban women. Even though most of 
them have to work eight hours a day, six days a week, their 
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lives have been made much easier than their mothers' 
generation. 
Another factor that helps form the small family norm is 
the pension system in cities. If you work in a state-owned 
company, you can get a pension after you retire. Women are not 
excluded. Exactly like men, a woman can get 80% of her 
previous salary after she is retired if she has worked in 
state industry for over 30 years. Otherwise, she gets 60%, 40% 
or less, depending on how long she has worked in a certain 
working unit. In some cities, childless women can get pensions 
of 100% of their previous salary (Xinhua, 10 July 1979, and 7 
Nov. 1979, in Chinese). 
Given this situation, children born to urban families 
have lost some of their value to their parents as a long-term 
investment for security in old age. Beside, bringing up a 
child in the cities is much more expensive than in the 
countryside. According to 1986 statistics, it costs 6,600 yuan 
(about $1320) to raise a child to the age of 16 in the 
countryside, while in urban areas it costs 18,740 yuan (about 
$6148) (Deng, 1989) . I remember hearing a lot of complaints 
from my friends and colleagues about the money they spend on 
their children. Usually an urban child uses about one third or 
even half of the family salary because he/she needs care, 
food, clothing, and education. Unlike children in the 
countryside, children in the cities cannot be much help to 
their families when they are young. 
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Since the average monthly salary of an urban woman is 
about $40 only (Hou, 1991), it is almost impossible to have 
any surplus left after all the expenses are paid. If you plan 
to have a child, your standard of living will most likely be 
lowered. Therefore, it requires serious consideration for an 
urban couple to decide to have even one child. 
Priority of housing is another vital attraction to urban 
women. 
Due to the longer life span (The average life span rose 
from 35 years in 1949, to 50 years in the 60s, to 69 years in 
1987) , 12 and a great increase in the urban population in the 
past ten years, housing has become a big problem in China's 
cities. According to the household survey in 1987, the average 
space for an urban resident is only 3.8 square meters, while 
a rural resident may have as many as 16 square meters. 13 
Therefore it is not uncommon in cities to see two or even 
three generations living under one roof. This situation can 
lead to some family conflicts and inconveniences. 
Population control planners are aware of this problem. In 
order to encourage urban women to accept the one-child-family 
policy, they promise these women housing priority. That is, if 
a woman stops at her first birth and claims the one-child 
certificate, her working unit is responsible to arrange for an 
12 See Hou Ruili's article, "China's Population Issues", 
an interview with Peng Pei-yun, the Minister of the State 
Family Planning Commission, China Today, Aug., 91, PP28-30. 
13 See Chinese Population Yearbook, 1988. 
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apartment for her family. This is an important bonus to urban 
residents, especially to those women who are trying to escape 
their mothers-in-law! 
Other incentives like priority for the only child to get 
medical care, to go to better schools, to be given an extra 5-
10 yuan per month until he/she is 14, are all attractive to 
urban women. The single child also has priority in job 
allocation (e.g. Xinhua, 7 Nov. 1979 in Chinese). This has 
greatly reduced the fears of parents that their only daughter 
will not get the beneficial state job because of 
discrimination against women in some working units. 
The above are the major factors that motivate urban women 
to accept the one-child-family policy. 
But what are the special factors that affect rural women 
in their attitudes toward the one-child~family policy? What 
kind of unique situations are they in? Are they happy about 
the policy? The following chapter will explore the possible 
answers. 
CHAPTER VI 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE POLICY FOR RURAL WOMEN 
Although the one-child-family policy has some potential 
beneficial outcomes for women, and has worked out quite well 
in cities, the consequences of this policy for rural women are 
not so good. Women in rural areas remain more traditionally 
bound by cultural and familial expectations. Generally 
speaking, the policy negatively affects rural women's labor, 
social, health and family status. These negative impacts can 
be seen by examining the sensitive position of women at home, 
the forced abortions perpetrated by government officials, the 
increases in female infanticide and wife-abandonment, and an 
increased pressure on girls to leave school early. This 
chapter will examine each of these effects. 
UNIVERSAL PREFERENCE FOR SONS 
Usually, a rural woman's position in a family is 
determined by the sex of the child she delivers. When a boy 
is born, the family will have some kind of celebration, say 
distributing red eggs, inviting relatives to enjoy "happy 
noodles", or having a banquet in a restaurant. And in most 
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cases, the mother's position in the family is automatically 
raised, because she has made a "great contribution" to carry 
on the family line. In contrast, if a woman gives birth to a 
girl, there is generally no celebration, no party, no friends. 
Instead the lying-in woman may have a bad time --- she might 
be scolded by her mother-in-law, beaten by her husband, and 
sometimes even divorced by her husband. The situation becomes 
even more serious in the countryside now that China is 
carrying out the one-child-family policy. 
Why are boys more desired than girls? In order to answer 
this question, it is necessary to go back to the traditional 
attitude of "the more children, the better", and the strong 
emphasis on having a son to carry on the family name. In old 
China, the child mortality rates were very high (The infant 
mortality rate dropped from 20% in 1949 to 4% in the 1980sw) 
and aged parents were mostly dependent on their sons for 
support. Actually, there has been a universal preference for 
sons in China for centuries. Sons continued the family line; 
upon marriage they brought their wives to live in the parental 
household and supported the older generation, and finally they 
tended the ancestral shrines. As a typical example of this 
expectation, the birth of a boy in preliberation China was 
usually celebrated as the arrival of a scholar who would lead 
the family to prosperity. But when a girl was born, she was 
considered no more important than a future operator of the 
14 See footnote 12 . 
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family spinning-wheel. Although improved medical care today 
has brought about a notable decrease of the infant death rate, 
some old ideas are hard to change. In the countryside, care of 
the elderly is still a family responsibility by custom. And to 
many peasants, the son is still the most reliable person, 
especially when parents are getting old. They consider a 
daughter only as a kind of parasitic being. When she is young, 
she depends on her parents; when she grows up and gets 
married, she depends on her husband. Traditionally she cannot 
carry on the family line, nor can she take care of her aged 
parents, because as soon as she gets married, she will join 
her husband's family, and become permanently separated from 
her own. Therefore, the parents often feel quite disappointed 
because the investment they put out to bring her up will never 
come back to them. 
In addition to the influence of the old traditional 
ideas, some practical problems have worsened the situation. In 
cities, most factory and official workers have regular 
pensions when they are retired, but not the peasants in the 
countryside. So when rural workers are too old to work in the 
fields, they have to ask their children to take care of them, 
and according to tradition, they will ask sons instead of 
daughters. Besides, the New Agricultural Policy has assigned 
cultivated land to each family, and in order to plough the 
farmland, peasants need more hands, especially a strong labor 
force. In this way, some contradictions emerge directly from 
the problems of the new state policies. 
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The family 
responsibility system encourages peasants' agricultural 
production, but the one-child-family policy prohibits the 
traditional rural strategy from increasing family labor power 
and income, traditionally accomplished by having many 
children, including several sons. 
As a result of the current production system and the 
traditional beliefs, many farmers in China still prefer large 
families with several sons. So in order to have more children 
and more sons, people have tried various methods to circumvent 
the one-child-family policy. In their desire to have sons, 
some couples even kill their baby girls through neglect or 
murder, a form of violence which has begun to draw more and 
more attention from the government. 
FEMALE INFANTICIDE 
Actually, female infanticide is not new in China. For 
centuries, it was always daughters who were sacrificed 
whenever there was competition for scarce resources. Usually 
female infanticide was practiced throughout China directly by 
intervention at birth. And indirectly it was practiced as a 
result of the malnutrition and sickness from which girls 
suffered disproportionately because of the unequal 
distribution of family food and medical attention. One local 
study of a village revealed that in the first five years of 
53 
life the boys outnumbered the girls in proportion of 100 to 35 
(Croll, 1985). Of course, this was an exceptional situation. 
However, without accurate data on the sex ratio at birth in 
the past, it has been impossible to measure the scale of 
female infanticide. Data from Beijing in 1917 show that the 
female mortality rate in the first year of life was nearly 30% 
higher than that of males. The death rate of females from 1 to 
5 years of age was 152 per 1000 and for males 122 per 1000. To 
some extent, this indicates that the neglect is strong (Croll, 
1985). Female infanticide used to be so widespread in China, 
especially in remote and destitute places, that its serious 
consequences are still felt today. For example, in Huaiyuan 
County, Anhui Province, quite a few male villagers over 40 
years old are unable to find female partners and get married 
(Beijing Review, No.5 Jan.31, 1983 P4). 
The Chinese people abolished the rural feudal system 
during the Land Reform Movement shortly after the birth of the 
People's Republic of China in 1949. As a result, the people's 
livelihood improved remarkably. Women increasingly joined men 
in productive labor and won greater respect from society. For 
many years female infanticide was not heard of (Beijing 
Review, No5, Jan.31,1983:4). 
The feudal idea of favoring boys over girls, however, is 
not completely gone. Some couples feel unfulfilled if they do 
not have a son. And a woman's failure to produce a male child 
to carry on the family line is still condemned, and sometimes 
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regarded as the greatest impiety. Thus some couples go on 
having children until a son is produced. This explains why a 
great number of rural families have more than two children, 
especially if the first two are daughters. 
The problem was complicated by the nation's population 
policy in 1979, which turns out to be a challenge for those 
who desire sons to carry forward their family lines. 
Since the one-child-family-policy allows each couple to 
have only one child, some people sell, desert or even kill 
their female babies in order to preserve their option of 
having a son. The exact figures of female infanticide are 
unknown, but there are indications that it may not be a rare 
occurrence. For instance, in some rural areas the ratio of 
boys to girls is 5 to 1, People's Daily reported in April 1983 
{The Oregonian, Sept. 26 ,91). In the eastern district of 
Hefei city in Anhui it was reported that at least 50 baby 
girls were drowned within a period of two months after the new 
population policy was implemented. This must have contributed 
to the unbalanced sex ratio of 112.45 to 100 among newborn 
babies in Anhui in 1981 (Beijing Review, 2 May 1983, P13). Li 
Chengrui, Director of the State Statistics Bureau also 
admitted that cases of drowning and abandoning female babies 
have been found in some areas (Ibid) . Former Premier Zhao 
Ziyang's condemnation of infanticide at the Fifth Session of 
the Fifth National People's Congress would also suggest that 
the practice is of national concern (The China Quarterly, 
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1984). Additionally, data released from China's 1990 census 
show a suspiciously high ratio of boys over girls in reported 
birth: 111.3 boys for every 100 girls. By some statistics, 
more than 600,000 baby girls (Oregonian, 91) who ought to be 
there, are not. They have simply disappeared. They were not 
reported in the 1990 census. 
Where are the baby girls? 
We know that the normal sex ratio throughout the world is 
about 105 or 106 boys to 100 girls. Evidence has shown that 
China, too, has a normal sex ratio (See Figure 2.) 
Boys born per100 girls 
110 -------- ---
\.. • /105 ---'·~·-
~ : 
130 '....,,,..._,_/ 1 00 
Boys born per 100 girls, by birth order 
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Sources: Chinese Census; Chinese State Statistical Bureau. Family Planning Commission 
Figure 2. Uneven Birthrates in China. Source: The 
Sunday Oregonian, June 23, 1991, A14. 
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From the only four census counts ever done in China, we 
can see that the sex ratio for newborn infants in the 1953 
census was 104.9 to 100, and in the 1964 census it was 103.8 
to 100. It was only beginning with the 1982 census, three 
years after the one-child-family policy was implemented, that 
the ratio changed noticeably. Two surveys done in 1987 and 
1989 respectively show an increasingly high sex ratio. The 
1987 survey found 110. 5 boys to 100 girls, while the 1989 
survey found 112.5 boys to 100 girls (Oregonian June 23, 91). 
Therefore, the sex ratio disparity shown in the 1990 census 
was not a fluke. 
As previously mentioned, female infanticide was common in 
pre-1949 China. But after 1949 it seemed to disappear, until 
recently. In the past, peasants who sought to survive in a 
competitive system of private landownership committed the 
crime and had to bear most of the moral responsibility 
themselves. But now peasants may place part of the blame on 
the government for limiting their freedom of choice to such an 
extent that they are being forced to kill their own flesh and 
blood (Wong Siu-lun, 1984). "We cultivate our own land, eat 
our own grain and bring up all our children on our own. We 
have taken responsibility of the land and there is no need for 
you to bother about our child birth", some peasants said. And 
more and more complaints like this keep appearing (Wong, 
1984) . 
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WIFE-BEATING AND WIFE-ABANDONMENT 
A related topic regarding the birth of the so-called 
"wrong" sex is wife-battering and wife-abandonment. 
There is scientific evidence that the sex of a fetus is 
not determined by the mother. Yet in their great desire to 
have sons, some men torment and desert their wives after they 
give birth to daughters. 
Since the announcement of the one-child-family policy in 
1979, the incidence of families' punishing women for ''wrong" 
reproductive results has increased substantially in the 
countryside, although it is impossible to know how frequently 
it occurs. The Chinese press has been publicizing and 
protesting cases of familial abuse. And a common explanation 
offered for wife-battering recently is the failure of a woman 
to bear male offspring. In 1982, the Women's Federation of 
Shenyang, Liaoning Province, reported that local cases of 
maltreatment of women who gave birth to girls were on the 
rise: twenty cases had been reported in the first half of the 
year, in contrast to almost none a year before. And there are 
even more divorce cases associated with production of the 
wrong (female) sex . (Henig and Hershatter, 1988) . When a woman 
does not produce sons after having had several daughters, or 
if she does not want to disobey the birth-control policy, she 
is frequently shunned or dismissed by her husband's family. 
, 
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Some husbands simply divorce their wives in order to marry 
other women and produce sons. Some commentators recognized 
this phenomenon as an unintended result of the one -child-
family policy (Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, 1982). 
The negative impact on the life of the abandoned women is 
obvious and great. First of all, they are ridiculed or looked 
down upon by the people around them, because they have been 
"deserted" by their husbands. 
Second, they run into serious economic problems. Because 
they depended on their husbands and do not have any remarkable 
skills, they have to toil in the fields like men, especially 
in the situation of the new agricultural policy. And abandoned 
women often have one or two daughters. In order to help 
support the family, the little girls are often forced to leave 
school and do housework or work in the fields with their 
mothers at an early age. According to statistics, "83% of the 
7.2 million children who drop out of school are girls", girls 
in the countryside (Women of China, 1990, Mar. P2). In the 
long run, this situation is likely to produce a high number of 
illiterate rural women. And low levels of education will most 
likely have a direct effect on fertility rates. In fact, in 
some remote areas, there is already a vicious cycle of 
ignorance followed by too many children, followed by poverty, 
followed by greater ignorance which again leads to too 
many children and more poverty. 
Third, these abandoned women lack self-confidence, and 
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often do not have the courage to interact with people freely. 
They cannot see any hope for their future, nor can they play 
an active role in overcoming poverty in their families. They 
are lonely, isolated and disassociated. Some of them truly 
become social outcasts. A special report on this subject can 
be found in Lu Yin's article in China Today, 1990. 
The promising sign is that the government has realized 
the seriousness of wife-battering and wife-abandonment, and 
since 1983, the All China Women's Federation has taken up the 
issue of protecting the legal rights of women in those 
domains. 
From the time the Communist Party took power in 1949, the 
ACWF has been the official and exclusive organization 
representing women. As long as the Women's Federation exists, 
government policy-makers apparently assume, women's interests 
are supposed to be protected and there is no need to form 
other organizations within, or independent of, the government. 
Like many other mass organizations, the Women's Federation was 
inactive during the Cultural Revolution, and reorganized only 
in 1979. During the early 1980's the primary function of the 
Women's Federation was to mobilize women to participate in 
government-sponsored political campaigns, rather than to 
represent the interests of women to the government. It was 
only in 1983, four years after the implementation of the one-
child-family policy, that the ACWF began to take action to 
protect women. By then, the issue of wife-battering and wife-
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abandonment had become an issue that could no longer be 
neglected. 
In April, 1983, the Secretariat of the Central Committee 
of the Chinese Communist Party decided to make "protecting the 
legal rights of women and children" a major component of 
Women's Federation's work. Local branches of the Women's 
Federation responded with a number of innovative institutional 
measures. In one Shanxi county, the Women's Federation and 
other local organizations in 1985 set up a "letter and visit 
network for women's problems" with branches in every village, 
to take complaints from women about parental interference in 
marriage choice and maltreatment. Village women no longer had 
to leave their home communities to voice their grievances. The 
purpose of the network was to resolve problems through 
mediation before legal action became necessary. 
The heart of the Women's Federation work, however, is 
intervention by dedicated local women cadres who want to see 
justice done. In one rural Liaoning case, for instance, 
Women's Federation cadres learned of a woman who had been 
maltreated by her husband for six years. When she demanded a 
divorce in June, 1984, he cut out her tongue. The Women's 
Federation conducted an investigation, provided information to 
the Party and government organs, and saw that the case was 
publicized in the press. Their efforts resulted in the man's 
trial and execution for causing grievous injury to his wife 
(Renmin Ribao, Jan. 7, 1984:7). 
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In another case in 1981, a cadre of the women's 
Federation of Nantong county, Jiangsu province, off on a 
business trip, heard of an outrageous incident. Peasant woman 
Chen Mei had a husband who was working away from home. Her 
father-in-law and brother-in-law suspected her of improper 
sexual conduct and beat her badly. They broke three of her 
ribs and punctured a lung. They would not let Chen Mei go to 
the hospital for treatment. They also persuaded a local cadre 
to threaten her not to tell anyone, and they kept her school-
age child locked up at home. Only on the third day, when 
someone from Chen's natal family arrived, did they send her to 
the hospital. 
When the Women's Federation cadre heard of this incident, 
one of the members hurried to the hospital, comforted Chen 
Mei, and said to her, " The Women's Federation will back you 
up." This cadre, along with the Party Committee and the 
Women's Federation of the commune, investigated the incident 
and made arrangements for Chen Mei's medical treatment and a 
place to live. The cadre immediately reported the incident to 
the county Party Committee. The county Women's Federation and 
the police conducted a joint investigation, and the assailants 
were punished in accordance with the law. At the court session 
where judgment was pronounced, the member of the cadre from 
the county Women's Federation said, " The Women's Federation 
speaks up for battered and abused women, and protects their 
legal rights and interests" (Zhongguo Funu, Jan.1981:44). 
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Although the movement to protect the legal rights of 
Chinese women still has a long way to go, the increased public 
attention to a strong legal system and the various efforts 
made to control gender violence are important steps in the 
move to the final elimination of violence against women. 
"FLOATING POPULATION" 
Another phenomenon associated with the one-child-family 
policy is rural women's joining the "floating" population with 
their husbands (China Today, 1991). That is, they wander from 
place to place, migrate to cities without proper residence 
permits, and deliberately seek to avoid pressure to use birth 
control because they want large families or want a son after 
having had several daughters. There are three frequently used 
patterns: 
1. The woman leaves her hometown with her husband shortly 
after they get married. They live in one city or town for a 
while and then move to another one. The husband does all kinds 
of temporary jobs to support the family, while the wife stays 
in their humble home, giving birth to children. After they 
fulfil their reproductive plan, they return to their 
hometown. 
2. The couple already has a daughter, and wants a son. They 
leave their young daughter in the care of her grandparents, 
and wander wherever they can, until they give birth to a son. 
~ I 
63 
3. After a woman gets pregnant, she is sent to a relative's 
home far from her own village. If the new-born is a son, she 
will come back happily. Otherwise, she will leave the infant 
girl with her relative, or simply desert her in order to come 
back home and get pregnant again. 
By "floating" they not only avoid the authorized "birth 
quota", but also escape successfully the expensive fine for 
giving birth to more than one child. 
According to some statistics, the floating population has 
risen to 50 million. By 1989, it was said that: 
Almost all of them (the floating population) have 
at least two children; some even have three or 
four. They buy grain and coal at negotiated prices, 
do not have a permanent job, and do not belong to 
any unit. They work hard to earn as much money as 
they can, and they can have as many children as 
they want. They form a social group that is 
virtually subject to no one's jurisdiction and 
thereby poses a serious threat to family planning 
efforts (Aird, 1990). 
These "floating" rural couples are very difficult for 
government officials to follow and tabulate. And given the 
difficulties of monitoring this group and effectively 
implementing family planning, these couples have produced a 
large number of over-large families. A 40-year-old farmer from 
Hanyang district in Wuhan15 has recently been found to have 
eleven children, five boys and six girls (Deng, 1989). Eighty 
rural families are now seeking temporary jobs in this 
15 Wuhan is a large and important industrial city in 
China. It is also the capital of Hunan Province, which is 
located in southern China. 
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district. These people already have two or more children, and 
they have given birth to a further twenty children since their 
arrival (Deng, 1989). A recent study shows that some 3 
million babies born in 1987, and 1 million in 1988 were 
unauthorized third or fourth children. And around 2.5 million 
people married below the legal age, putting them in the 
position to give birth at a relatively early age (Hu, 1989). 
Besides the extra burdens the "floating population" has 
added to the country, the "floating" women have many problems 
and difficulties. The most common one is that they cannot get 
proper medical treatment during pregnancy and even during 
delivery. As mentioned before, Chinese women are expected to 
have official authorization to become pregnant. When they are 
pregnant without permission, they are unable to get prenatal 
care because they lack authorization papers to present to 
local health clinics (Chen, 1985; Weisskopf, 1985). As a 
result, the "floating" mothers and their babies often suffer 
from malnutrition, and the health of the new-born babies is 
negatively affected. 
Nevertheless, a number of rural women still prefer to 
join the "floating population" than to stay at home. The 
obvious reason is that they can have as many children as they 
want. Meanwhile they can avoid the reproduction coercion from 
the government. 
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BIRTH CONTROL AND RURAL WOMEN 
The fertility decline among rural women has been the 
result of a determined and successful birth planning program. 
And an inseparable part of the program is the prevailing use 
of contraceptives in the countryside. Since the late 1970s, 
various contraceptive instruments have been gradually 
introduced to the countryside, and more and more rural women 
have started using them. Although considerable achievement has 
been made, birth control in the countryside still has several 
common problems which affect rural women: 
1. IUDs, abortions and sterilizations are the most common 
contraceptives used in the rural areas. And the practice of 
birth control is primarily considered to be the responsibility 
of married women ---- a responsibility arising from their sex 
role as bearers of children; it is women who get abortions; It 
is women who use IUDs, and it is usually women who are 
sterilized. Under the one-child-family policy, rural families 
show a greater preference for sterilizing a daughter-in-law 
rather than a son. Patriarchal families also prefer female 
sterilization because they value men and do not want to put 
them at risk. If things go on like this, husbands and in-laws 
of sterilized women may press for divorce in order to try to 
get grandsons by a second wife. In fact, some people have 
already applied this divorce strategy as a possible 
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alternative if the first-born child is a girl. In addition, 
some sterilized women suffer form "sideaches" (internal 
infections) and lose their ability to work; some of them even 
lose their lives (Dalsimera and Nisonoff, 1987). The 
seriousness of the problem can be sensed by listening to Li 
Lianxin's16 concerns: "What I'm most worried about is that 
something may go wrong during the vas sterilization owing to 
the poorly-equipped rural clinics," she says. "No economic 
compensation can counteract side effect or loss of life ... " 
(Women of China, Sept.1989). 
2. As previously mentioned, 53% of the rural women rely 
on IUDs. And once a woman has had the IUD inserted, she is 
unable, and does not have the freedom or right, to take it 
out. 
The most-widely used IUD in China is a modified Ota made 
of stainless steel. rt has no string on it and, therefore, can 
only be removed by a trained medical person with a fine metal 
hook. Also, files on women's method of contraception are kept, 
and women are required to receive regular examinations to make 
sure that their coils are in place and no "unplanned" 
pregnancies have occurred. Usually, doctors and nurses are not 
allowed to remove IUDs from any woman without official 
authorization. Those who have done so without permission from 
an associated birth-control official will be punished. In the 
16 Li Lian-xin is a woman cadre member in Yuncheng County, 
Shanxi Province. 
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past few years, many cases have been published in newspapers 
and magazines, criticizing doctors and nurses who have 
unofficially removed IUDs. 
3. In some poor and remote areas, forced abortions are 
still very common. 
In theory, the nationwide birth control programs have 
made all contraceptive methods available to married couples. 
In practice, only the urban women have options to choose 
different 'birth control methods, and to get contraceptives 
free from a nationwide contraceptive distribution network. In 
some rural areas, it is still difficult for women to get 
contraceptive devices. And in some other areas, abortions are 
the only available method for women. Dalsimer and Nisonoff 
in 1982 mentioned in their article that "extreme measures like 
sequestration of pregnant women to convince them to abort and 
arrests by Public Security officials, the women sometimes are 
bound and transported in animal cages, followed by late 
abortions" . 17 Even Peng Peiyun, minister of the State Family 
Planning Commission, admitted that "some abortions on women in 
the later stages of pregnancies do occur in remote areas" 
(Beijing Review, Mar. 91, P29). 
4. Handing out fines has proved to be useless in the past 
few years. 
17 Also see John Gittings, "Communes: New Directions or 
Abandonment? China Now, No. 102 (May/June, 1982; and Aird in 
particular, emphasizes the coercions of women which result 
form the one-child-family policy. 
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As previously mentioned, since 1979, there has been no 
national law to guarantee the implementation of the one-child-
family policy. Therefore various local measures have come into 
effect. One of the most common methods of control in the 
countryside is fining, but recently it has ceased to be 
effective. In the first few years of the one-child-family 
policy, parents of an unplanned second birth were fined 2,000 
to 3,000 yuan (approximately a yearly salary of a university 
professor) , which was a shocking figure for most of the 
peasants. In the past few years, however, because of the 
responsibility system and economic reform, many getting-rich-
quick farmers have emerged. These newly-rich farmers are not 
at all afraid of being fined. (See Figure 3.) 
As for the poor families, they simply open their doors to 
the birth control workers and tell them to take whatever they 
like (Xiao and Chen, 1989). To these poor families, the 
potential labor productivity of sons can ultimately reduce 
economic disincentives imposed by the government. 
"The situation in the countryside is different from that 
in the cities," Pei Yingping, a woman cadre member, says. "It 
is true that the more sons you have, the quicker your family 
becomes well-off. And no farmer does not wish to earn more 
money as soon as possible" (Xiao & Yan, 1989). 
One might ask: for whom are children born? Who wants more 
children and who wants fewer and why? The interests of the 
state and of private families are not necessarily the same; 
' 
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nor are the interests of the mother, the father, and the 
grandparents the same. Women bear the burden of retribution 
from the government when they bear an extra child, and in 
rural areas from their families when they bear a female child. 
As Wolf states: " If a woman's husband and his family decide 
that it is worth the economic risk, it is her body that must 
conceal the illegal pregnancy, her body that will be the 
target of the cadre's anger if its quota is exceeded, her body 
that will endure a forced abortion perhaps too late to be 
entirely safe" (Wolf, 1985). 
'I' 
•Don't be afraid, kids. Your dad has enough money to pay the fine." The sign says: 
A fine will be Imposed for having extra children. Chang Tieiun 
Figure 3. Cartoon. Source: China Reconstructs 
XXXVIII, No.7, July 1989, P31. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study is to explore the implications 
of the one-child-family policy for Chinese women. Various 
kinds of descriptive data have been applied to analyze the 
positive and negative impacts of the policy on both urban and 
rural women in China. The results of the study have confirmed 
the two hypotheses advanced at the beginning of the thesis. 
This study shows that since the implementation of the 
one-child-family policy, Chinese women's age at first marriage 
has increased; years women spend in childbearing and child 
rearing have decreased; the percent of women of childbearing 
age who use contraceptives has increased. 
This study also shows that urban women are more willing 
to accept this government policy because they benefit more 
from the policy than their rural counterparts. For example, 
since the implementation of the one-child-family policy, there 
has been a great increase in social services and medical care 
programs for young mothers in the cities. The reduced number 
of years spent on childbearing and child rearing has enabled 
urban women to participate in their education improvement, 
working outside home, and various social movements. Above all, 
~ I 
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urban women's attitude toward the gender of the only child has 
changed. To many women now, a baby girl is as acceptable as a 
baby boy. 
Compared with urban women, rural women in China seem to 
be negatively affected by the one-child-family policy more 
than they are compatible with it. Instead of getting all the 
benefits urban women have received from the one-child-family 
policy, rural women's labor, social, health, and family status 
has been negatively affected: female infanticide reappears; 
wife-beating and wife-abandonment increase; "floating 
population" emerges. The thesis also discusses the birth-
control problems with rural women and the pressure they feel 
from their families' desire of having sons. 
The findings of this study show that so long as the one-
child-family policy remains, the differential responses of 
rural and urban women are likely to remain. So long as rural 
women's personal goals remain unfulfilled, the problem will 
continue. 
The findings of the study also reveal a very serious 
problem with the one-child-family in rural China. That is, 
although the policy reduces China's population rapidly, it 
damages rural women's lives. Furthermore, it will surely 
damage the future generations of all Chinese women, especially 
rural women if the policy is extended into future decades. 
According to .some reports, Chinese government plans to 
carry on the one-child-family policy for another ninety years 
• I 
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in order to reduce the total population to the ideal number 
- 700 million. NINETY YEARS! What will happen to China's 
females ninety years later if the current problems remain? 
This and many other problems definitely need to be further 
tackled and studied. But one thing is clear: the one-child-
family policy is not the best solution to raise Chinese 
women's status or to protect women. To me, the policy can only 
be regarded as a kind of "transitional resolution" (one of the 
conflict resolutions offered by conflict theorists in 
sociology) . It will not lead to permanent termination of the 
current population problems China has now, but it does 
facilitate temporary reduction so that more permanent 
conciliatory structures and solutions may be developed and 
maintained. 
• I 
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APPENDIX 
The following is a list of conditions that enables any 
couple whether urban or rural to apply for permission to have 
a second child (Davin, 1985). 
1. The first child suffers from a medically-certificated, 
nonhereditary disability and is not expected to grow up 
to be an able-bodied laborer. 
2. One spouse has a child by a previous marriage but the 
other does not. 
3. A couple believed to be infertile adopt a child after 
years of marriage and the woman subsequently becomes 
pregnant. 
4. Both spouses are of minority nationality. 
5. Both spouses are overseas Chinese who have returned 
from abroad. 
Some rural areas have different conditions. The following 
is the set of conditions issued by Shanxi province in 1982, 
providing an interesting range of exceptions. 18 
1. The husband has settled in the home of his wife's 
parents and she is an only child. 
18 See "Shanxi Planned Parenthood Regulations", Shanxi 
Ribao, September,17, 1982. 
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2. They live in sparsely populated mountain villages 
disadvantaged both in terms of transport and natural 
conditions. 
3. The husband is the only one among three brothers to be 
capable of fathering a child. 
4.The husband is the only son of someone who died for the 
revolution. 
5. One spouse has a major disability. 
6. The family has had only one son in a generation for 
three consecutive generations. 
7. Both spouses are themselves only children. 
